John J. Mearsheimer
Department of Political Science
Stephen M. Walt
March 2006 RWP06‐011
The two authors of this Working Paper are solely responsible for the views expressed in it. As academic institutions,
An edited and reworked version of this paper was published in the London Review of Books Vol. 28, No. 6 (March 23, 2006), and is available online at www.lrb.co.uk
ISRAEL LOBBY AND FOREIGN POLICY U.S.
This situation has no equal in American political history. Why has the
Instead, the overall thrust of
In the pages that follow, we describe how the Lobby has accomplished this feat, and how its activities have shaped
others, both Americans and non‐Americans need to understand and address the Lobby’s influence on
Some readers will find this analysis disturbing, but the facts recounted here are not in serious dispute among scholars. Indeed, our account relies heavily on the work of Israeli scholars and journalists, who deserve great credit for shedding light on these issues. We also rely on evidence provided by respected Israeli and international human rights organizations. Similarly, our claims about the Lobby’s impact rely on testimony from the Lobby’s own members, as well as testimony from politicians who have worked with them. Readers may reject our conclusions, of course, but the evidence on which they rest is not controversial.
THE GREAT BENEFACTOR
Since the October War in 1973,
intelligence that it denies its NATO allies and has turned a blind eye towards
As discussed below,
This extraordinary generosity might be understandable if
A STRATEGIC LIABILITY
According to the American‐Israel Public Affairs Committee’s (AIPAC) website, “the
article of faith among
Beginning in the 1990s, and especially after 9/11,
This new rationale seems persuasive, but
To begin with, “terrorism” is a tactic employed by a wide array of political groups; it is not a single unified adversary. The terrorist organizations that threaten
More importantly, saying that
Equally important, unconditional
As for so‐called rogue states in the Middle East, they are not a dire threat to vital U.S. interests, apart from the U.S. commitment to Israel itself. Although the United States does have a number of disagreements with these regimes, Washington would not be nearly as worried about Iran, Ba’thist Iraq, or Syria were it not so closely tied to Israel. Even if these states acquire nuclear weapons—which is obviously not desirable—it would not be a strategic disaster for the
to terrorists is equally remote, because a rogue state could not be sure the transfer would be undetected or that it would not be blamed and punished afterwards.
In short, treating Israel as America’s most important ally in the campaign against terrorism and assorted Middle East dictatorships both exaggerates Israel’s ability to help on these issues and ignores the ways that Israel’s policies make U.S. efforts more difficult.
Unquestioned support for
A final reason to question
country that spies on the
A DWINDLING MORAL CASE
Apart from its alleged strategic value, Israel’s backers also argue that it deserves unqualified U.S. support because 1) it is weak and surrounded by enemies, 2) it is a democracy, which is a morally preferable form of government; 3) the Jewish people have suffered from past crimes and therefore deserve special treatment, and 4) Israel’s conduct has been morally superior to its adversaries’ behavior.
On close inspection, however, each of these arguments is unpersuasive. There is a strong moral case for supporting
Backing the Underdog?
Aiding a Fellow Democracy?
American backing is often justified by the claim that
The “shared democracy” rationale is also weakened by aspects of Israeli democracy that are at odds with core American values. The
Compensation for Past Crimes
A third moral justification is the history of Jewish suffering in the Christian West, especially the tragic episode of the Holocaust. Because Jews were persecuted for
centuries and can only be safe in a Jewish homeland, many believe that
There is no question that Jews suffered greatly from the despicable legacy of anti‐Semitism, and that
The history of these events is well‐understood. When political Zionism began in earnest in the late 19th century, there were only about 15,000 Jews in Palestine.29 In 1893, for example, the Arabs comprised roughly 95 percent of the population, and though under Ottoman control, they had been in continuous possession of this territory for 1300 years.30 Even when Israel was founded, Jews were only about 35 percent of Palestine’s population and owned 7 percent of the land.31
The mainstream Zionist leadership was not interested in establishing a bi‐national state or accepting a permanent partition of
To achieve this goal, the Zionists had to expel large numbers of Arabs from the territory that would eventually become
This opportunity came in 1947‐48, when Jewish forces drove up to 700,000 Palestinians into exile.35 Israeli officials have long claimed that the Arabs fled because their leaders told them to, but careful scholarship (much of it by Israeli historians like Morris) have demolished this myth. In fact, most Arab leaders urged the Palestinian population to stay home, but fear of violent death at the hands of Zionist forces led most of them to flee.36 After the war,
The fact that the creation of
Since then, Israeli leaders have repeatedly sought to deny the Palestinians’ national ambitions.38 Prime Minister Golda Meir famously remarked that “there was no such thing as a Palestinian,” and even Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who signed the 1993 Oslo Accords, nonetheless opposed creating a full‐fledged Palestinian state.39 Pressure from extremist violence and the growing Palestinian population has forced subsequent Israeli leaders to disengage from some of the occupied territories and to explore territorial compromise, but no Israeli government has been willing to offer the Palestinians a viable state of their own. Even Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s purportedly generous offer at Camp David in July 2000 would only have given the Palestinians a disarmed and dismembered set of “
Europe’s crimes against the Jews provide a clear moral justification for
“Virtuous Israelis” versus “Evil Arabs”
The final moral argument portrays
Israeli scholarship shows that the early Zionists were far from benevolent towards the Palestinian Arabs.42 The Arab inhabitants did resist the Zionists’ encroachments, which is hardly surprising given that the Zionists were trying to create their own state on Arab lands. The Zionists responded vigorously, and
neither side owns the moral high ground during this period. This same scholarship also reveals that the creation of
The IDF also murdered hundreds of Egyptian prisoners‐of‐war in both the 1956 and 1967 wars.46 In 1967, it expelled between 100,000 and 260,000 Palestinians from the newly‐conquered West Bank, and drove 80,000 Syrians from the Golan Heights.47 It was also complicit in the massacre of 700 innocent Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps following its invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and an Israeli investigatory commission found then‐Defence Minister Sharon “personally responsible” for these atrocities.48
Israeli personnel have tortured numerous Palestinian prisoners, systematically humiliated and inconvenienced Palestinian civilians, and used force indiscriminately against them on numerous occasions. During the First Intifida (1987‐1991), for example, the IDF distributed truncheons to its troops and encouraged them to break the bones of Palestinian protestors. The Swedish “Save the Children” organization estimated that “23,600 to 29,900 children required medical treatment for their beating injuries in the first two years of the intifida,” with nearly one‐third sustaining broken bones. Nearly one‐third of the beaten children were aged ten and under.”49
peace activists, including a 23 year‐old American woman crushed by an Israeli bulldozer in March 2003.53
These facts about Israel’s conduct have been amply documented by numerous human rights organizations—including prominent Israeli groups—and are not disputed by fair‐minded observers. And that is why four former officials of Shin Bet (the Israeli domestic security organization) condemned
In fact, this argument is not a compelling moral justification either. Palestinians have used terrorism against their Israeli occupiers, and their willingness to attack innocent civilians is wrong. This behavior is not surprising, however, because the Palestinians believe they have no other way to force Israeli concessions. As former Prime Minister Barak once admitted, had he been born a Palestinian, he “would have joined a terrorist organization.”55
Finally, we should not forget that the Zionists used terrorism when they were in a similarly weak position and trying to obtain their own state. Between 1944 and 1947, several Zionist organizations used terrorist bombings to drive the British from Palestine, and took the lives of many innocent civilians along the way.56 Israeli terrorists also murdered U.N. mediator Count Folke Bernadotte in 1948, because they opposed his proposal to internationalize Jerusalem.57 Nor were the perpetrators of these acts isolated extremists: the leaders of the murder plot were eventually granted amnesty by the Israeli government and one of them was elected to the Knesset. Another terrorist leader, who approved the murder but was not tried, was future Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Indeed, Shamir openly argued that “neither Jewish ethics nor Jewish tradition can disqualify terrorism as a means of combat.” Rather, terrorism had “a great part to play … in our war against the occupier [
The explanation lies in the unmatched power of the Israel Lobby. Were it not for the Lobby’s ability to manipulate the American political system, the relationship between
What Is The Lobby?
We use “the Lobbyʺ as a convenient short‐hand term for the loose coalition of individuals and organizations who actively work to shape
The core of the Lobby is comprised of American Jews who make a significant effort in their daily lives to bend
Jewish‐Americans also differ on specific Israeli policies. Many of the key organizations in the Lobby, like AIPAC and the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations (CPMJO), are run by hardliners who generally supported the expansionist policies of
Not surprisingly, American Jewish leaders often consult with Israeli officials, so that the former can maximize their influence in the
policy on a certain issue, but we must check what the Israelis think.’ We as a community do it all the time.”62 There is also a strong norm against criticizing Israeli policy, and Jewish‐American leaders rarely support putting pressure on
Similarly, when Israel Policy Forum president Seymour Reich advised Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to pressure Israel to reopen a critical border crossing in the Gaza Strip in November 2005, critics denounced his action as “irresponsible behavior,” and declared that, “There is absolutely no room in the Jewish mainstream for actively canvassing against the security‐related policies . . . of Israel.”64 Recoiling from these attacks, Reich proclaimed that “the word pressure is not in my vocabulary when it comes to
Jewish‐Americans have formed an impressive array of organizations to influence American foreign policy, of which AIPAC is the most powerful and well‐known. In 1997, Fortune magazine asked members of Congress and their staffs to list the most powerful lobbies in Washington.65 AIPAC was ranked second behind the American Association of Retired People (AARP), but ahead of heavyweight lobbies like the AFL‐CIO and the National Rifle Association. A National Journal study in March 2005 reached a similar conclusion, placing AIPAC in second place (tied with AARP) in the
The Lobby also includes prominent Christian evangelicals like Gary Bauer, Jerry Falwell, Ralph Reed, and Pat Robertson, as well as Dick Armey and Tom DeLay, former majority leaders in the House of Representatives. They believe Israel’s rebirth is part of Biblical prophecy, support its expansionist agenda, and think pressuring Israel is contrary to God’s will.67 In addition, the Lobby’s membership includes neoconservative gentiles such as John Bolton, the late Wall Street Journal editor Robert Bartley, former Secretary of Education William Bennett, former U.N. Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick, and columnist George Will.
Sources of Power
Furthermore, special interest groups enjoy disproportionate power when they are committed to a particular issue and the bulk of the population is indifferent. Policymakers will tend to accommodate those who care about the issue in question, even if their numbers are small, confident that the rest of the population will not penalize them.
The Israel Lobby’s power flows from its unmatched ability to play this game of interest group politics. In its basic operations, it is no different from interest groups like the Farm Lobby, steel and textile workers, and other ethnic lobbies. What sets the Israel Lobby apart is its extraordinary effectiveness. But there is nothing improper about American Jews and their Christian allies attempting to sway
Strategies for Success
The Lobby pursues two broad strategies to promote
Second, the Lobby strives to ensure that public discourse about
candid discussion of U.S.‐Israeli relations might lead Americans to favor a different policy.
A key pillar of the Lobby’s effectiveness is its influence in the U.S. Congress, where
One reason for the Lobby’s success with Congress is that some key members are Christian Zionists like Dick Armey, who said in September 2002 that “My No. 1 priority in foreign policy is to protect
Pro‐Israel congressional staffers are another source of the Lobby’s power. As Morris Amitay, a former head of AIPAC, once admitted, “There are a lot of guys at the working level up here [on Capitol Hill] … who happen to be Jewish, who are willing … to look at certain issues in terms of their Jewishness …. These are all guys who are in a position to make the decision in these areas for those senators …. You can get an awful lot done just at the staff level.”70
It is AIPAC itself, however, that forms the core of the Lobby’s influence in Congress. AIPAC’s success is due to its ability to reward legislators and congressional candidates who support its agenda, and to punish those who challenge it. Money is critical to
There is no doubt about the potency of these tactics. To take but one example, in 1984 AIPAC helped defeat Senator Charles Percy from Illinois, who, according to one prominent Lobby figure, had “displayed insensitivity and even hostility to
our concerns.” Thomas Dine, the head of AIPAC at the time, explained what happened: “All the Jews in
AIPAC’s influence on Capitol Hill goes even further, however. According to Douglas Bloomfield, a former AIPAC staff member, “It is common for members of Congress and their staffs to turn to AIPAC first when they need information, before calling the Library of Congress, the Congressional Research Service, committee staff or administration experts.”72 More importantly, he notes that AIPAC is “often called upon to draft speeches, work on legislation, advise on tactics, perform research, collect co‐sponsors and marshal votes.”
The bottom line is that AIPAC, which is a de facto agent for a foreign government, has a stranglehold on the U.S. Congress.73 Open debate about
Influencing the Executive
The Lobby also has significant leverage over the Executive branch. That power derives in part from the influence Jewish voters have on presidential elections. Despite their small numbers in the population (less than 3 percent), they make large campaign donations to candidates from both parties. The Washington Post once estimated that Democratic presidential candidates “depend on Jewish supporters to supply as much as 60 percent of the money.”76 Furthermore, Jewish voters have high turn‐out rates and are concentrated in key states like
Key organizations in the Lobby also directly target the administration in power. For example, pro‐Israel forces make sure that critics of the Jewish state do not get important foreign‐policy appointments. Jimmy Carter wanted to make George
Ball his first secretary of state, but he knew that Ball was perceived as critical of
These constraints still operate today. When 2004 presidential candidate Howard Dean called for the United States to take a more “even‐handed role” in the Arab‐Israeli conflict, Senator Joseph Lieberman accused him of selling Israel down the river and said his statement was “irresponsible.”78 Virtually all of the top Democrats in the House signed a hard‐hitting letter to Dean criticizing his comments, and the Chicago Jewish Star reported that “anonymous attackers … are clogging the e‐mail inboxes of Jewish leaders around the country, warning ‐‐ without much evidence ‐‐ that Dean would somehow be bad for Israel.”79
This worry was absurd, however, because Dean is in fact quite hawkish on Israel.80 His campaign co‐chair was a former AIPAC president, and Dean said his own views on the
The Lobby’s goals are also served when pro‐Israel individuals occupy important positions in the executive branch. During the Clinton Administration, for example, Middle East policy was largely shaped by officials with close ties to Israel or to prominent pro‐Israel organizations—including Martin Indyk, the former deputy director of research at AIPAC and co‐founder of the pro‐Israel Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP); Dennis Ross, who joined WINEP after leaving government in 2001; and Aaron Miller, who has lived in Israel and often visits there.81
These men were among President Clinton’s closest advisors at the
“negotiating with two Israeli teams ‐‐ one displaying an Israeli flag, and one an American flag.”83
The situation is even more pronounced in the Bush Administration, whose ranks include fervently pro‐Israel individuals like Elliot Abrams, John Bolton, Douglas Feith, I. Lewis (“Scooter”) Libby, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, and David Wurmser. As we shall see, these officials consistently pushed for policies favored by
Manipulating the Media
In addition to influencing government policy directly, the Lobby strives to shape public perceptions about
The Lobby’s perspective on
This pro‐Israel bias is reflected in the editorials of major newspapers. Robert Bartley, the late editor of the Wall Street Journal, once remarked that, “Shamir, Sharon, Bibi – whatever those guys want is pretty much fine by me.”85 Not surprisingly, the Journal, along with other prominent newspapers like The Chicago Sun‐Times and The Washington Times regularly run editorials that are strongly pro‐Israel. Magazines like Commentary, the New Republic, and the Weekly Standard also zealously defend
Editorial bias is also found in papers like the New York Times. The Times occasionally criticizes Israeli policies and sometimes concedes that the Palestinians have legitimate grievances, but it is not even‐handed. In his memoirs, for example, former Times executive editor Max Frankel acknowledged
the impact his own pro‐Israel attitude had on his editorial choices. In his words: “I was much more deeply devoted to
The media’s reporting of news events involving
These factors help explain why the American media contains few criticisms of Israeli policy, rarely questions
Think Tanks That Think
Pro‐Israel forces predominate in
The Lobby’s influence in the think tank world extends well beyond WINEP. Over the past 25 years, pro‐Israel forces have established a commanding presence at the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institution, the
Center for Security Policy, the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the Hudson Institute, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA). These think tanks are decidedly pro‐Israel, and include few, if any, critics of
A good indicator of the Lobby’s influence in the think tank world is the evolution of the Brookings Institution. For many years, its senior expert on
The Lobby has had the most difficulty stifling debate about
The Lobby moved aggressively to “take back the campuses.” New groups sprang up, like the Caravan for Democracy, which brought Israeli speakers to
The Lobby also monitors what professors write and teach. In September 2002, for example, Martin Kramer and Daniel Pipes, two passionately pro‐Israel neoconservatives, established a website (Campus Watch) that posted dossiers on
suspect academics and encouraged students to report comments or behavior that might be considered hostile to Israel.94 This transparent attempt to blacklist and intimidate scholars prompted a harsh reaction and Pipes and Kramer later removed the dossiers, but the website still invites students to report alleged anti‐Israel behavior at
Groups in the Lobby also direct their fire at particular professors and the universities that hire them.
A classic illustration of the effort to police academia occurred in late 2004, when the “David Project” produced a propaganda film alleging that faculty in Columbia University’s Middle East studies program were anti‐Semitic and were intimidating Jewish students who defended Israel.97 Columbia was raked over the coals in pro‐Israel circles, but a faculty committee assigned to investigate the charges found no evidence of anti‐Semitism and the only incident worth noting was the possibility that one professor had “responded heatedly” to a student’s question.98 The committee also discovered that the accused professors had been the target of an overt intimidation campaign.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this campaign to eliminate criticism of
Finally, a number of Jewish philanthropists have established Israel studies programs (in addition to the roughly 130 Jewish Studies programs that already exist) so as to increase the number of Israel‐friendly scholars on campus.100 NYU
announced the establishment of the
In sum, the Lobby has gone to considerable lengths to insulate
The Great Silencer
No discussion of how the Lobby operates would be complete without examining one of its most powerful weapons: the charge of anti‐Semitism. Anyone who criticizes Israeli actions or says that pro‐Israel groups have significant influence over U.S. Middle East policy—an influence that AIPAC celebrates—stands a good chance of getting labeled an anti‐Semite. In fact, anyone who says that there is an Israel Lobby runs the risk of being charged with anti‐Semitism, even though the Israeli media themselves refer to
Europeans have been more willing than Americans to criticize Israeli policy in recent years, which some attribute to a resurgence of anti‐Semitism in
serious crime; 87 percent think attacks on French synagogues are scandalous; and 85 percent of practicing French Catholics reject the charge that Jews have too much influence in business and finance.105 It is unsurprising that the head of the French Jewish community declared in the summer of 2003 that “France is not more anti‐Semitic than America.”106 According to a recent article in Haʹaretz, the French police report that anti‐Semitic incidents in
Finally, when a French Jew was brutally murdered last month by a Muslim gang, tens of thousands of French demonstrators poured into the streets to condemn anti‐Semitism. Moreover, President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin both attended the victim’s memorial service in a public show of solidarity with French Jewry.108 It is also worth noting that in 2002 more Jews immigrated to Germany than Israel, making it “the fastest growing Jewish community in the world,” according to an article in the Jewish newspaper Forward.109 If Europe were really heading back to the 1930s, it is hard to imagine that Jews would be moving there in large numbers.
We recognize, however, that
This is why pro‐Israel forces, when pressed to go beyond assertion, claim that there is a ‘new anti‐Semitism’, which they equate with criticism of Israel.112 In other words criticize Israeli policy and you are by definition an anti‐Semite. When the synod of the Church of England recently voted to divest from Caterpillar Inc on the grounds that Caterpillar manufactures the bulldozers used to demolish Palestinian homes, the Chief Rabbi complained that it would ʹhave the most adverse repercussions on ... Jewish‐Christian relations in Britainʹ, while Rabbi Tony Bayfield, the head of the Reform movement, said: “ʹThere is a clear problem of anti‐Zionist ‐ verging on anti‐Semitic ‐ attitudes emerging in the grass
roots, and even in the middle ranks of the Church.”113 However, the Church was neither guilty of anti‐Zionism nor anti‐Semitism; it was merely protesting Israeli policy.114
Critics are also accused of holding
In sum, other ethnic lobbies can only dream of having the political muscle that pro‐Israel organizations possess. The question, therefore, is what effect does the Lobby have on
THE TAIL WAGGING THE DOG
If the Lobby’s impact were confined to
Demonizing the Palestinians
It is now largely forgotten, but in the fall of 2001, and especially in the spring of 2002, the Bush Administration tried to reduce anti‐American sentiment in the Arab world and undermine support for terrorist groups like al Qaeda, by halting
Bush had enormous potential leverage at his disposal. He could have threatened to reduce
among “politically active” Americans.115 Indeed, 73 percent said that
Yet the Bush Administration failed to change
The story begins in late September 2001 when President Bush began pressuring Israeli Prime Minister Sharon to show restraint in the occupied territories. He also pressed Sharon to allow Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres to meet with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, even though Bush was highly critical of Arafat’s leadership.117 Bush also said publicly that he supported a Palestinian state.118 Alarmed by these developments, Sharon accused Bush of trying “to appease the Arabs at our expense,” warning that Israel “will not be Czechoslovakia.”119
Bush was reportedly furious at
The Lobby also went to work in Congress. On November 16, 89 senators sent Bush a letter praising him for refusing to meet with Arafat, but also demanding that the United States not restrain Israel from retaliating against the Palestinians and insisting that the administration state publicly that it stood steadfastly behind Israel. According to the New York Times, the letter “stemmed from a meeting two weeks ago between leaders of the American Jewish community and key senators,” adding that AIPAC was “particularly active in providing advice on the letter.”123
By late November, relations between Tel Aviv and Washington had improved considerably. This was due in part to the Lobby’s efforts to bend U.S. policy in Israel’s direction, but also to America’s initial victory in Afghanistan, which
reduced the perceived need for Arab support in dealing with al Qaeda.
But trouble erupted again in April 2002, after the IDF launched Operation Defensive Shield and resumed control of virtually all of the major Palestinian areas on the West Bank.125 Bush knew that Israel’s action would damage America’s image in the Arab and Islamic world and undermine the war on terrorism, so he demanded on April 4 that Sharon “halt the incursions and begin withdrawal.” He underscored this message two days later, saying this meant “withdrawal without delay.” On April 7, Bush’s national security advisor, Condoleezza Rice, told reporters that, “‘without delay’ means without delay. It means now.” That same day Secretary of State Colin Powell set out for the
The first sign that Bush was caving came on April 11—only one week after he told
Meanwhile, Congress was also moving to back
ongoing support of terror by Yasir Arafat,” who was portrayed as a central element of the terrorism problem.131 A few days later, a bipartisan congressional delegation on a fact‐finding mission in Israel publicly proclaimed that Sharon should resist U.S. pressure to negotiate with Arafat.132 On May 9, a House appropriations subcommittee met to consider giving Israel an extra $200 million to fight terrorism. Secretary of State Powell opposed the package, but the Lobby backed it, just as it had helped author the two congressional resolutions.133 Powell lost.
In short, Sharon and the Lobby took on the President of the
The situation has changed little since then. The Bush Administration refused to deal further with Arafat, who eventually died in November 2004. It has subsequently embraced the new Palestinian leader, Mahmoud Abbas, but has done little to help him gain a viable state. Sharon continued to develop his plans for unilateral “disengagement” from the Palestinians, based on withdrawal from Gaza coupled with continued expansion on the West Bank, which entails building the so‐called “security fence,” seizing Palestinian‐owned land, and expanding settlement blocs and road networks. By refusing to negotiate with Abbas (who favors a negotiated settlement) and making it impossible for him to deliver tangible benefits to the Palestinian people,
which is why John Kerry went to great lengths to display his unalloyed support for
Israel and the War Iraq
On August 16, 2002, eleven days before Vice President Cheney kicked off the campaign for war with a hard‐line speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Washington Post reported that “
Israeli leaders were deeply distressed when President Bush decided to seek U.N. Security Council authorization for war in September, and even more worried when Saddam agreed to let U.N. inspectors back into
Peres told reporters in September 2002 that “the campaign against Saddam Hussein is a must. Inspections and inspectors are good for decent people, but dishonest people can overcome easily inspections and inspectors.”143
At the same time, former Prime Minister Ehud Barak wrote a New York Times op‐ed warning that “the greatest risk now lies in inaction.”144 His predecessor, Benjamin Netanyahu, published a similar piece in the Wall Street Journal entitled “The Case for Toppling Saddam.”145 Netanyahu declared, “Today nothing less than dismantling his regime will do,” adding that “I believe I speak for the overwhelming majority of Israelis in supporting a pre‐emptive strike against Saddam’s regime.” Or as Ha’aretz reported in February 2003: “The [Israeli] military and political leadership yearns for war in
But as Netanyahu suggests, the desire for war was not confined to
The Lobby and the
Within the United States, the main driving force behind the Iraq war was a small band of neoconservatives, many with close ties to Israel’s Likud Party.150 In addition, key leaders of the Lobby’s major organizations lent their voices to the campaign for war.151 According to the Forward, “As President Bush attempted to sell the . . . war in Iraq, America’s most important Jewish organizations rallied as one to his defense. In statement after statement community leaders stressed the need to rid the world of Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction.”152 The editorial goes on to say that “concern for
Although neoconservatives and other Lobby leaders were eager to invade
blame the war in
The neoconservatives were already determined to topple Saddam before Bush became President.155 They caused a stir in early 1998 by publishing two open letters to President Clinton calling for Saddam’s removal from power.156 The signatories, many of whom had close ties to pro‐Israel groups like JINSA or WINEP, and whose ranks included Elliot Abrams, John Bolton, Douglas Feith, William Kristol, Bernard Lewis, Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz, had little trouble convincing the Clinton Administration to adopt the general goal of ousting Saddam.157 But the neoconservatives were unable to sell a war to achieve that objective. Nor were they able to generate much enthusiasm for invading
That help arrived with 9/11. Specifically, the events of that fateful day led Bush and Cheney to reverse course and become strong proponents of a preventive war to topple Saddam. Neoconservatives in the Lobby—most notably Scooter Libby, Paul Wolfowitz, and Princeton historian Bernard Lewis—played especially critical roles in persuading the President and Vice‐President to favor war.
For the neoconservatives, 9/11 was a golden opportunity to make the case for war with
Meanwhile, other neoconservatives were at work within the corridors of power. We do not have the full story yet, but scholars like Lewis and Fouad Ajami of John Hopkins University reportedly played key roles in convincing Vice President Cheney to favor the war.161 Cheney’s views were also heavily influenced by the neoconservatives on his staff, especially Eric Edelman, John Hannah, and chief of staff Libby, one of the most powerful individuals in the Administration.162 The Vice President’s influence helped convince President Bush by early 2002. With Bush and Cheney on board, the die for war was cast.
Outside the administration, neoconservative pundits lost no time making the case that invading
These salvoes were the beginning of an unrelenting public relations campaign to win support for invading Iraq.165 A key part of this campaign was the manipulation of intelligence information, so as to make Saddam look like an imminent threat. For example, Libby visited the CIA several times to pressure analysts to find evidence that would make the case for war, and he helped prepare a detailed briefing on the Iraq threat in early 2003 that was pushed on Colin Powell, then preparing his infamous briefing to the U.N. Security Council on the Iraqi threat.166 According to Bob Woodward, Powell “was appalled at what he considered overreaching and hyperbole. Libby was drawing only the worst conclusions from fragments and silky threads.”167 Although Powell discarded Libby’s most outrageous claims, his U.N. presentation was still riddled with errors, as Powell now acknowledges.
The campaign to manipulate intelligence also involved two organizations that were created after 9/11 and reported directly to Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith.168 The Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group was tasked to find links between al Qaeda and
Like virtually all the neoconservatives, Feith is deeply committed to
Wolfowitz is equally committed to
Finally, a brief word is in order about the neoconservatives’ prewar support of Ahmed Chalabi, the unscrupulous Iraqi exile who headed the Iraqi National Congress (INC). They embraced Chalabi because he had worked to establish close ties with Jewish‐American groups and had pledged to foster good relations with
Given the neoconservatives’ devotion to
March 2005 that the belief that Israel and the neoconservatives conspired to get the United States into a war in Iraq was “pervasive” in the U.S. intelligence community.177 Yet few people would say so publicly, and most that did ‐‐ including Senator Ernest Hollings (D‐SC) and Representative James Moran (D‐VA) ‐‐ were condemned for raising the issue.178 Michael Kinsley put the point well in late 2002, when he wrote that “the lack of public discussion about the role of Israel … is the proverbial elephant in the room: Everybody sees it, no one mentions it.”179 The reason for this reluctance, he observed, was fear of being labeled an anti‐Semite. Even so, there is little doubt that
Dreams of Regional Transformation
Pro‐Israel forces have long been interested in getting the
This policy changed after the first Gulf War, when the Clinton Administration adopted a strategy of “dual containment.” It called for stationing substantial
There was considerable dissatisfaction with dual containment by the mid‐1990s, because it made the United States the mortal enemy of two countries who also hated each other, and it forced Washington to bear the burden of containing both of them.183 Not surprisingly, the Lobby worked actively in Congress to save dual containment.184 Pressed by AIPAC and other pro‐Israel forces, Clinton toughened up the policy in the spring of 1995 by imposing an economic embargo on Iran. But AIPAC et al wanted more. The result was the 1996
By the late 1990s, however, the neoconservatives were arguing that dual containment was not enough and that regime change in
Charles Krauthammer describes this grand scheme as the brainchild of Natan Sharansky, the Israeli politician whose writings have impressed President Bush.187 But Sharansky was hardly a lone voice in
In short, Israeli leaders, neoconservatives, and the Bush Administration all saw war with
Israeli leaders did not push the Bush Administration to put its crosshairs on
Prominent members of the Lobby made the same arguments after Baghdad fell.193 Wolfowitz declared that “there has got to be regime change in Syria,” and Richard Perle told a journalist that “We could deliver a short message, a two‐worded message [to other hostile regimes in the Middle East]: ‘You’re next’.”194 In early April, WINEP released a bipartisan report stating that
Back on Capitol Hill, Congressman Eliot Engel (D‐NY) had reintroduced the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act on April 12.197 It threatened sanctions against Syria if it did not withdraw from Lebanon, give up its WMD, and stop supporting terrorism, and it also called for Syria and Lebanon to take concrete steps to make peace with Israel. This legislation was strongly endorsed by the Lobby—especially AIPAC—and “framed,” according to the Jewish Telegraph Agency, “by some of
in the House; 89‐4 in the Senate), and Bush signed it into law on December 12, 2003.199
Yet the Bush Administration was still divided about the wisdom of targeting
Bush’s ambivalence is understandable. First, the Syrian government had been providing the United States with important intelligence about al Qaeda since 9/11 and had also warned Washington about a planned terrorist attack in the Gulf.201 Syria had also given CIA interrogators access to Mohammed Zammar, the alleged recruiter of some of the 9/11 hijackers. Targeting the Assad regime would jeopardize these valuable connections, and thus undermine the larger war on terrorism.
Yet Congress insisted on putting the screws to
in the Crosshairs Iran
Israelis tend to describe every threat in the starkest terms, but
Sharon began publicly pushing the United States to confront Iran in November 2002, in a high profile interview in The Times (London).204 Describing Iran as the “center of world terror,” and bent on acquiring nuclear weapons, he declared that the Bush Administration should put the strong arm on Iran “the day after” it conquered Iraq. In late April 2003, Ha’aretz reported that the Israeli ambassador in
The neoconservatives also lost no time in making the case for regime change in Tehran.206 On May 6, the AEI co‐sponsored an all‐day conference on Iran with the pro‐Israel Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and the Hudson Institute.207 The speakers were all strongly pro‐Israel, and many called for the United States to replace the Iranian regime with a democracy. As usual, there were a bevy of articles by prominent neoconservatives making the case for going after
The Bush Administration has responded to the Lobby’s pressure by working overtime to shut down
One might argue that
allies if the Lobby did not exist, but
It is not surprising that
But even if the United States fails to transform the Middle East and finds itself in conflict with an increasingly radicalized Arab and Islamic world, Israel still ends up protected by the world’s only superpower.210 This is not a perfect outcome from the Lobby’s perspective, but it is obviously preferable to Washington distancing itself from Israel, or using its leverage to force Israel to make peace with the Palestinians.
Can the Lobby’s power be curtailed? One would like to think so, given the Iraq debacle, the obvious need to rebuild America’s image in the Arab and Islamic world, and the recent revelations about AIPAC officials passing U.S. government secrets to Israel. One might also think that Arafat’s death and the election of the more moderate Abu Mazen would cause
But that is not going to happen anytime soon. AIPAC and its allies (including Christian Zionists) have no serious opponents in the lobbying world. They know it has become more difficult to make
This situation is deeply worrisome, because the Lobbyʹs influence causes trouble on several fronts. It increases the terrorist danger that all states face—including Americaʹs European allies. By preventing
Furthermore, the Lobby’s campaign for regime change in
There is a moral dimension here as well. Thanks to the Lobby, the
Moreover, the Lobby’s campaign to squelch debate about
Finally, the Lobby’s influence has been bad for
empowered extremist groups like Hamas, and reduced the number of Palestinian leaders who would be both willing to accept a fair settlement and able to make it work. This course raises the awful specter of
But there is a ray of hope. Although the Lobby remains a powerful force, the adverse effects of its influence are increasingly difficult to hide. Powerful states can maintain flawed policies for quite some time, but reality cannot be ignored forever. What is needed, therefore, is a candid discussion of the Lobby’s influence and a more open debate about
1 Indeed, the mere existence of the Lobby suggests that unconditional support for
2 According to the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) “Greenbook,” which reports “overseas loans and grants,”
3 According to the “Greenbook,”
That averages out to $589 per Israeli. If one assumes the same population size and $3 billion in total aid, then each Israeli receives $478.
4 See http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/; World Bank Atlas (
5 For a discussion of the various special deals that
7 “Report of the Open‐Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council,” Annex III, U.N. General Assembly Official Records, 58th Session, Supplement No. 47, 2004, pp. 13‐14; Donald Neff, “An Updated List of Vetoes Cast by the United States to Shield Israel from Criticism by the U.N. Security Council,” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, May/June 2005; Stephen Zunes, “U.S. Declares Open Season on UN Workers,” CommonDreams.org, January 10,
2003. There were also many resolutions that never came to a vote because Security Council members knew that the
8 Marc Perelman, “International Agency Eyes Israeli Nukes,” Forward, September 5, 2003.
9 William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab‐Israeli Conflict since 1967, 3rd ed. (
10 Nathan Guttman, “
11 Downloaded from AIPAC’s website [http://aipac.org/documents/unitedefforts.html] on January 12, 2006.
12 See, for example, Warren Bass, Support Any Friend: Kennedy’s Middle East and the Making of the US‐Israel Alliance (NY: Oxford University Press, 2003); A.F.K. Organski, The $36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in U.S. Assistance to Israel (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Steven L. Spiegel, “Israel as a Strategic Asset,” Commentary, June 1983, pp. 51‐ 55; Idem, The Other Arab‐Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).
13 This point was not lost on Moshe Dayan, who, remembering a talk he had with Henry Kissinger at the time of the October 1973 War, noted that “though I happened to remark that the United States was the only country that was ready to stand by us, my silent reflection was that the United States would really rather support the Arabs.” Moshe Dayan, Moshe Dayan: Story of My Life (NY: William Morrow, 1976), pp. 521‐513. Also see Zach Levey, “The United States’ Skyhawk Sale to
14 Bernard Lewis wrote in 1992, “Whatever value Israel might have had as a strategic asset during the Cold War, that value obviously ended when the Cold War itself came to a close. The change was clearly manifested in the Gulf War last year, when what the United States most desired from Israel was to keep out of the conflict ‐‐ to be silent, inactive and, as far as possible, invisible ….
15 According to Middle East expert Shibley Telhami, “No other issue resonates with the public in the Arab world, and many other parts of the Muslim world, more deeply than
16 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks against the
that both of these pieces were published right after the
17 Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for
18 See The Pew Global Attitudes Project, America Admired, Yet Its New Vulnerability Seen As Good Thing, Say Opinion Leaders (Washington, DC: The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, December 19, 2001); Pew Global Attitudes Project, Views of a Changing World 2003, p. 5.
19 For a copy of the letter, see “Doomed to Failure in the Middle East,” The Guardian, April 27, 2004. Also see Nicholas Blanford, “US Moves Inflame Arab Moderates,” The Christian Science Monitor, April 26, 2004; Rupert Cornwell, “Allies Warn Bush that Stability in Iraq Demands Arab‐Israeli Deal,” The Independent, June 10, 2004; Glenn Kessler and Robin Wright, “Arabs and Europeans Question ‘Greater Middle East’ Plan,” Washington Post, February 22, 2004; Paul Richter, “U.S. Has Fresh Hope for Mideast,” Los Angeles Times, November 7, 2004; Robin Wright and Glenn Kessler, “U.S. Goals for Middle East Falter,” Washington Post, April 21, 2004. Even some Israelis understand that “the continuation of this conflict, including the Israeli occupation, will most certainly lead to new waves of terror; international terrorism, which the Americans fear so much, will spread.” Ze’ev Schiff, “Fitting into
copy of the American letter was published in The New York Review of Books, November 18, 2004.
20 Consider, for example, the controversy that erupted in 2005 over
21 Quoted in Duncan L. Clarke, “
Out of New Fighter‐Jet Development Program,” Ha’aretz, October 12, 2005; Nina Gilbert, “Yaron Won’t Give Info on Arms Sales to China,” Jerusalem Post, December 30, 2004; “Israeli, U.S. Talks on Weapons Deals with China End without Result,” Ha’aretz, June 29, 2005; Marc Perelman, “Spat Over Sales of Weapons Chilling Ties between Jerusalem and Beijing,” Forward, December 23, 2004; Marc Perelman, “China Crisis Straining U.S.‐Israel Ties,” Forward, August 5, 2005; Marc Perelman, “Israel Miffed over Lingering China Flap,” Forward, October 7, 2005; Ze’ev Schiff, “U.S.‐Israel Crisis Deepens over Defense Exports to China,” Ha’aretz, July 27, 2005.
22 Quoted in Duncan L. Clarke, “
23 On the Pollard affair, see Hersh, Samson Option, pp. 285‐305; Idem, “The Traitor: Why Pollard Should Never Be Released,” New Yorker, Vol. 74, issue 42 (January 18, 1999), pp. 26‐33. There are a huge number of articles on the internet dealing with the Franklin Affair. For a good overview of the case, see Jeffrey Goldberg, “Real Insiders: A Pro‐Israel Lobby and an F.B.I. Sting,” New Yorker, Vol. 81, issue 19 (July 4, 2005), pp. 34‐40.
24 Trevor N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab‐Israeli Wars, 1947‐1974 (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), pp. 3‐19, 121‐125, 146‐147, 212‐214, 231‐244, 333‐340, 388‐390, 597‐605, 623‐633; Simha Flapan, The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987), pp. 189‐199; Rashid Khalidi, “The Palestinians and 1948: The Underlying Causes of Failure,” in Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim, eds., The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948 (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 12‐36; Haim Levenberg, Military Preparations of the Arab Community in Palestine, 1945‐1948 (London: Frank Cass, 1993); Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), chapters 1,3. Idem, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist‐Arab Conflict, 1881‐1999 (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1999), pp. 187‐189, 191‐196, 217‐223, 235‐236, 241‐242, 286‐291, 311‐313, 393‐395; Martin Van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Forces (NY: Public Affairs, 1998), pp. 77‐82, 137‐138, 179‐182.
25 Amos Harel, “
26 For three instructive pieces on this matter from the Israeli press, see Amiram Barkat, “Majority of Israelis Are Opposed to Intermarriage, Survey Finds,” Ha’aretz, September 15, 2003; Nicky Blackburn, “Better a Jew,” Ha’aretz, April 21, 2004; Lily Galili, “Hitting Below the Belt,” Ha’aretz, August 8, 2004.
27 See “The Official Summation of the Or Commission Report,” published in Ha’aretz, September 2, 2003. For evidence of how hostile many Israelis were to the report’s findings and recommendations, see “No Avoiding the Commission Recommendations,” Ha’aretz, September 4, 2003; Molly Moore, “Israeli Report Is Welcomed, Dismissed,” Washington Post, September 3, 2003. Also see Bernard Avishai, “Saving Israel from Itself: A Secular Future for the Jewish State,” Harper’s Magazine, January 2005. It is also worth noting that the Israel Democracy Institute reported in May 2003 that: 53 percent of Israeli Jews “are against full equality for the Arabs”; 77 percent of Israeli Jews believe that “there should be a Jewish majority on crucial political decisions”; only 31 percent “support having Arab political parties in the government”; 57 percent “think that the Arabs should be encouraged to emigrate.” See “The Democracy Index: Major Findings 2003.” Imagine the outcry that would occur if a majority of white Americans declared that blacks, Hispanics, and Asians “should be encouraged” to leave the
28 Quoted in Justin Huggler, “
29 The first wave of European Jews to come to
30 The total population of
31 Flapan, Birth of
32 Flapan, Birth of
33 Masalah, Expulsion of the Palestinians, p. 128. Also see Morris, Righteous Victims, pp. 140, 142, 168‐169.
34 Benny Morris, “A New Exodus for the
35 Morris, Birth Revisited, provides a detailed account of this event. Also see Meron Benvenisti, Sacred Landscape: The Buried History of the Holy Land since 1948, trans. Maxine Kaufman‐Lacusta (
36 Erskine Childers, “The Other Exodus,” Spectator, May 12, 1961; Flapan, Birth of Israel, pp. 81‐118; Walid Khalidi, “Why Did the Palestinians Leave Revisited,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 34, No. 2 ( Winter 2005), pp. 42‐54; Idem, “The Fall of Haifa,” Middle East Forum, Vol. 35, No. 10 (December, 1959), pp. 22‐32; Morris, Birth Revisited.
37 Nahum Goldmann, The Jewish Paradox, trans. Steve Cox (NY: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), p. 99. Ze’ev Jabotinsky, the founding father of the Israeli right, made essentially the same point when he wrote, “Colonization is self‐explanatory and what it implies is fully understood by every sensible Jew and Arab. There can only be one purpose in colonization. For the country’s Arabs that purpose is essentially unacceptable. This is a natural reaction and nothing will change it.” Quoted in Ian Lustick, “To Build and To
Be Built By:
38 See Geoffrey Aronson, Israel, Palestinians, and the Intifada: Creating Facts on the West Bank (London: Kegan Paul International, 1990); Amnon Barzilai, “A Brief History of the Missed Opportunity,” Ha’aretz, June 5, 2002; Idem, “Some Saw the Refugees as the Key to Peace,” Ha’aretz, June 11, 2002; Moshe Behar, “The Peace Process and Israeli Domestic Politics in the 1990s,” Socialism and Democracy, Current Issue Number 32, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Summer‐Fall 2002), pp. 34‐47; Adam Hanieh and Catherine Cook, “A Road Map to the Oslo Cul‐de‐Sac,” Middle East Report Online, May 15, 2003; “Israel’s Interests Take Primacy: An Interview with Dore Gold,” in bitterlemons.org, “What Constitutes a Viable Palestinian State?” March 15, 2004, Edition 10; Nur Masalha, Imperial
39 Rahid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness (NY: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 147. Meir also said, “It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in
40 Charles Enderlein, Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace Process in the Middle East, 1995‐2002, trans. Susan Fairfield (NY: Other Press, 2003), pp. 201, 207‐208; Jeremy Pressman, “Visions in Collision: What Happened at
presented to the Palestinians at Camp David, a copy of which can be found in Roane Carey, ed., The New Intifada: Resisting Israel’s Apartheid (
41 See Alan Dershowitz, The Case for
42 Morris, Righteous Victims, chapters 2‐5.
43 Morris, Birth Revisited. It should be noted that many Israeli documents concerning the events of 1948 remain classified; Morris expects “that with respect to both expulsions and atrocities, we can expect additional revelations as the years pass and more Israeli records become available.” Morris, “Revisiting the Palestinian Exodus,” in Rogan and Shlaim, War for
44 Benny Morris,
45 During his negotiations with the British and French governments over the launching of the 1956 war, Ben‐Gurion proposed a grand plan for reordering the region that would have divided
46 Gabby Bron, “Egyptian POWs Ordered to Dig Graves, Then Shot by Israeli Army,” Yedioth Ahronoth, August 17, 1995; Ronal Fisher, “Mass Murder in the 1956 Sinai War,” Ma’ariv, August 8, 1995 [Copies of these two pieces can be found in Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 148‐155]; Galal Bana, “Egypt: We Will Turn to the International War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague if Israel Will Not Compensate Murdered Prisoners of War,” Ha’aretz, July 24, 2002; Zehavat, Friedman, “Personal Reminiscence: Remembering Ami Kronfeld,” in Jewish Voice for Peace, Jewish Peace News, September 25, 2005; Metres, “As Evidence Mounts.”
47 Avnery, “Crying Wolf”; Robert Blecher, “Living on the Edge: The Threat of ‘Transfer’ in
48 “Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in
49 Swedish Save the Children, “The Status of Palestinian Children during the Uprising in the Occupied Territories,” Excerpted Summary Material,
gunfire”; nearly twenty percent suffered multiple gunshot wounds; twelve percent were shot from behind; fifteen percent of the children were ten years of age or younger; “most children were not participating in a stone‐throwing demonstration when shot dead”; and “nearly one‐fifth of the children were shot dead while at home or within ten meters of their homes.”
50 “Unbridled Force,” Ha’aretz editorial, March 16, 2003. For other evidence, see Jonathan Cook, “Impunity on Both Sides of the Green Line,” MERIP, Middle East Report Online, November 23, 2005; “When Everything Is Permissible,” Ha’aretz editorial, June 6, 2005; “It Can Happen Here,” Ha’aretz editorial, November 22, 2004; Chris McGreal, “Snipers with Children in Their Sights,” Guardian, June 28, 2005; Idem, “Israel Shocked by Image of Soldiers Forcing Violinist to Play at Roadblock,” Guardian, November 29, 2004; Greg Myre, “Former Israeli Soldiers Tell of Harassment of Palestinians,” New York Times, June 24, 2004; Reuven Pedatzur, “The Message to the Soldiers Was Clear,” Ha’aretz, December 13, 2004; Conal Urquhart, “Israeli Soldiers Tell of Indiscriminate Killings by Army and A Culture of Impunity,” Guardian, September 6, 2005.
51 See Swisher, Truth about
52 According to B’tselem, between September 29, 2000, and December 31, 2005, 3,386 Palestinians were killed by the Israelis, of whom 676 were children. Of those 3,386 deaths, 1,185 were bystanders, 1,008 were killed while fighting the Israelis, and the circumstances of 563 deaths are unknown. During the same period, 992 Israelis were killed by the Palestinians, 118 of whom were children. Of those 992 deaths, 683 were civilians and 309 belonged to Israeli security forces. B’tselem press release, January 4, 2006.
53 Nathan Guttman, “‘It’s a Terrible Thing, Living with the Knowledge that You Crushed Our Daughter’,” Ha’aretz, April 30, 2004; Adam Shapiro, “Remembering Rachel Shapiro,” Nation, March 18, 2004; Tsahar Rotem, “British Peace Activist Shot by IDF Troops in Gaza Strip,” Ha’aretz, April 11, 2003.
54 Molly Moore, “Ex‐Security Chiefs Turn on
55 Bill Maxwell, “
56 See J. Bowyer Bell, Terror Out of Zion: The Fight for Israeli Independence ( New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1996); Joseph Heller, The Stern Gang: Ideology, Politics and Terror, 1940‐1949 (London: Frank Cass, 1995); Bruce Hoffmann, The Failure of British Military Strategy within Palestine, 1939‐1947 (Israel: Bar‐Ilan University, 1983); Morris, Righteous Victims, pp. 173‐180; Segev, One Palestine, pp. 468‐486. According to Haim Levenberg, 210 of the 429 casualties from Jewish terrorism in
58 Quoted in Chomsky, Fateful Triangle, pp. 485‐486. Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol used to call Menachem Begin “the terrorist.” Barzilai, “Brief History.” On Shamir, see Avishai Margalit, “The Violent Life of Yitzhak Shamir,” New York Review of Books, May 14, 1992, pp. 18‐24.
60 Steven M. Cohen, The 2004 National Survey of American Jews, sponsored by the Jewish Agency for Israel’s Department of Jewish‐Zionist Education, February 24, 2005. The figure two years earlier was 28 percent. See Steven M. Cohen, The 2002 National Survey of American Jews, sponsored by the Jewish Agency for
61 J.J. Goldberg, “Old Friend, Shattered Dreams,” Forward, December 24, 2004; Esther Kaplan, “The Jewish Divide on Israel,” Nation, July 12, 2004; Michael Massing, “Conservative Jewish Groups Have Clout,” Los Angeles Times, March 10, 2002; Eric Yoffie, “Reform the Conference,” Forward, August 2, 2002.
62 Ori Nir, “FBI Probe: More Questions Than Answers.” Forward, May 13, 2005.
63 Inigo Gilmore, “
64 Liebler, “When
65 Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, “
66 Richard E. Cohen and Peter Bell, “Congressional Insiders Poll,” National Journal. March 5, 2005; James D. Besser, “Most Muscle? It’s NRA, Then AIPAC and AARP,” Chicago Jewish Star, March 11‐24, 2005.
67 See Max Blumenthal, “Born‐Agains for Sharon,” salon.com, October 30, 2004; Darrell L. Bock, “Some Christians See a ‘Road Map’ to End Times,” Los Angeles Times, June 18, 2003; Nathan Guttman, “Wiping Out Terror, Brining On Redemption,” Ha’aretz, April 29, 2002; Tom Hamburger and Jim VandeHei, “Chosen People: How Israel Became a Favorite Cause of Christian Right,” Wall Street Journal, May 23, 2002; Paul Nussbaum, “Israel Finds an Ally in American Evangelicals,” Philadelphia Inquirer, November 17, 2005. Daniel Pipes maintains that, “other than the Israel Defense Forces,
68 The weakness of the “Palestinian Lobby” in the United States is captured in the headlines of these two articles: Nora Boustany, “Palestinians’ Lone Hand in Washington,” Washington Post, April, 19, 2002; George Gedda, “PLO Loses D.C. Office Because of Unpaid Rent,” Chicago Tribune, April 12, 2002. On the weak impact of the “Arab Lobby,” see Ali A. Mazrui, “Between the Crescent and the Star‐Spangled Banner: American Muslims and U.S. Foreign Policy,” International Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (July 1996), pp. 493‐506; Nabeel A. Khoury, “The Arab Lobby: Problems and Prospects,”
Middle East Journal, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 379‐396; Andrea Barron, “Jewish and Arab Diasporas in the United States and Their Impact on U.S. Middle East Policy,” in Yehuda Lukacs and Abdalla M. Battah, eds., The Arab‐Israeli Conflict: Two Decades of Change (London: Westview, 1988), pp. 238‐259.
69 Jake Tapper, “Questions for Dick Armey: Retiring, Not Shy,” New York Times Magazine, September 1, 2002. Also, Tom DeLay has called himself “an Israeli at heart.” See James Bennet, “DeLay Says Palestinians Bear Burden for Achieving Peace,”
70 Quoted in Mitchell Bard, “Israeli Lobby Power,” Midstream, Vol. 33, No. 1 (January 1987), pp. 6‐8.
71 Quoted in Edward Tivnan, The Lobby: Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1987), p. 191. J.J. Goldberg, the editor of the Forward, said in 2002, “There is this image in Congress that you don’t cross these people or they take you down.” Quoted in John Diamond and Brianna B. Piec, “Pro‐Israel Groups Intensify Political Front in
72 Quoted in Camille Mansour, Beyond
73 Although AIPAC has been able to use its political muscle to avoid having to register as a foreign agent for another government, it is especially concerned about that problem today because of the Larry Franklin spy scandal, and thus it is going to considerable lengths to emphasize its “American side.” See Ori Nir, “Leaders Fear Probe Will Force Pro‐Israel Lobby to File as ‘Foreign Agent’ Could Fuel Dual Loyalty Talk,” Forward, December 31, 2004; Idem, “Leaders Stress American Side of AIPAC,” Forward, May 27, 2005.
74 “Sen. Hollings Floor Statement Setting the Record Straight on His Mideast Newspaper Column,” May 20, 2004, a copy of which can be found on the former Senator’s web site.
75 Published in an AIPAC advertisement in the Chicago Jewish Star, August 29 – September 11, 2003.
76 Thomas B. Edsall and Alan Cooperman, “GOP Uses Remarks to Court Jews,”
77 Douglas Brinkley, “Out of the
78 E.J. Kessler, “Lieberman and Dean Spar Over
79 Zunes, “Attacks on Dean”; James D. Besser, “Dean’s Jewish Problem,” Chicago Jewish Star, December 19, 2003 ‐‐ January 8, 2004.
80 E.J. Kessler, “Dean Plans to Visit
81 Laura Blumenfeld, “Three Peace Suits; For These Passionate American Diplomats, a Middle East Settlement is the Goal of a Lifetime,” Washington Post, February 24, 1997.
82 Samuel (“Sandy”) Berger, President Clinton’s National Security Advisor, reports that at one point during the negotiations at Camp David (July 2000), Dennis Ross made the remarkable comment that, “If Barak offers anything more, I’ll be against this agreement.” Unedited transcript of “Comments by Sandy Berger at the Launch of How Israelis and Palestinians Negotiate (USIP Press, 2005),” U.S. Institute of Peace,
83 Quoted in Blumenfeld, “Three Peace Suits.”
84 Eric Alterman, “Intractable Foes, Warring Narratives,” MSNBC.com, March 28, 2002.
85 Quoted in Bret Stephens, “Eye on the Media by Bret Stephens: Bartley’s Journal,” Jerusalem Post, November 21, 2002.
86 Max Frankel, The Times of My Life And My Life with the Times (NY: Random House, 1999), pp. 401‐403.
87 Felicity Barringer, “Some
88 Barringer, “Some
89 Joel Beinin, “Money, Media and Policy Consensus: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,” Middle East Report, January‐February 1993, pp. 10‐15; Mark H. Milstein, “Washington Institute for Near East Policy: An AIPAC ‘Image Problem’,”
90 Quoted in Milstein, “Washington Institute.”
91 “Brookings Announces New
92 James D. Besser, “Turning up Heat in Campus Wars,” Jewish Week, July 25, 2003; Ronald S. Lauder and Jay Schottenstein, “Back to School for Israel Advocacy,” Forward,
November 14, 2003; Rachel Pomerance, “
93 Besser, “Turning up Heat.” In 2002 and 2003, AIPAC brought 240 college students to
94 Michael Dobbs, “Middle East Studies under Scrutiny in
95 Jonathan R. Cole, “The Patriot Act on Campus: Defending the University Post‐‐9/11,”
96 Chanakya Sethi, “Khalidi Candidacy for New Chair Draws Fire,” Daily Princetonian, April 22, 2005; Idem, “Debate Grows over Khalidi Candidacy,” Daily Princetonian, April 28, 2005.
97 Robert Gaines, “The Battle at Columbia University,” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, April 2005, pp. 56‐57; Caroline Glick, “Our World: The Columbia Disaster,” Jerusalem Post, April 4, 2005; Joseph Massad, “Witch Hunt at Columbia: Targeting the University,” CounterPunch, June 3, 2005; Nathaniel Popper, “Columbia Students Say Firestorm Blurs Campus Reality,” Forward, February 11, 2005; Scott Sherman, “The Mideast Comes to Columbia,” Nation, April 4, 2005; Chanan Weissman, “Columbia Unbecoming,” Jerusalem Post, February 6, 2005.
98 “Columbia University Ad Hoc Grievance Committee, Final Report, New York, 28 March 2005 (excerpts),” in Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Summer 2005), pp. 90‐100.
99 Goldberg, “Osama University?”; Ron Kampeas, “Campus Oversight Passes Senate as Review Effort Scores a Victory,” JTA, November 22, 2005; Stanley Kurtz, “Reforming the Campus: Congress Targets Title VI,” National Review Online, October 14, 2003; McNeil, “War on Academic Freedom”; Ori Nir, “Groups Back Bill to Monitor Universities,”
Forward, March 12, 2004; Sara Roy, “Short Cuts,”
100 The number 130 comes from Mitchell G. Bard, “Tenured or Tenuous: Defining the Role of Faculty in Supporting Israel on Campus,” Report published by The Israel on Campus Coalition and The American‐Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, May 2004, p. 11. Also see Nacha Cattan, “NYU Center: New Addition to Growing Academic Field,” Forward, May 2, 2003; Samuel G. Freedman, “Separating the Political Myths from the Facts in Israel Studies,” New York Times, February 16, 2005; Jennifer Jacobson, “The Politics of Israel Studies,” Chronicle of Higher Education, June 24, 2005, pp. 10‐12; Michael C. Kotzin, “The Jewish Community and the Ivory Tower: An Urgent Need for Israel Studies,” Forward, January 30, 2004; Nathaniel Popper, “Israel Studies Gain on Campus as Disputes Grow,” Forward, March 25, 2005.
101 Quoted in Cattan, “
102 Jonathan Kessler, “Pro‐Israel Activism Makes Comeback on Campus,” Forward, December 26, 2003; Popper, “Campuses Improving”; Barry Silverman and Randall Kaplan, “Pro‐Israel College Activists Quietly Successful on Campus,” JTA, May 9, 2005; Chanan Tigay, “As Students Return to Campus, Activists Prepare a New Approach,” JTA, September 1, 2005. Nevertheless, there are limits to the Lobby’s effectiveness on campuses. See Joe Eskenazi, “Book: College Campuses Quiet, but Anti‐Israel Feeling Is Growing,” JTA, November 29, 2005; Gary Rosenblatt, “
103 Quoted in Tony Judt, “Goodbye to All That?” Nation, January 3, 2005.
104 Anti‐Defamation League (ADL), “Attitudes toward Jews,
105 Martin Peretz, the editor‐in‐chief of the New Republic, says, “The headquarters of anti‐Semitic Europe today, just as during the
Regrets,” New Republic, April 22, 2002, p. 50. The data in this paragraph are from “Anti‐Semitism in
106 Quoted in Marc Perelman, “Community Head:
107 “French Police: Anti‐Semitism in
108 “French Protest for Murdered Jew,” BBC News Online, February 26, 2006; Michel Zlotowski, “Large Memorial Held for Parisian Jew,”
109 Avi Beker, “The Eternally Open Gate,” Ha’aretz, January 11, 2005; Josef Joffe, “A Boom, if Not A Renaissance, in Modern‐Day
110 The chairman of the Education Department of the Jewish Agency recently said that “present day violent anti‐Semitism originates from two separate sources: radical Islamists in the Middle East and Western Europe as well as the neo‐Nazi youth element in Eastern Europe and
111 In the ADL’s April 2004 survey, “Attitudes toward Jews, Israel and the Palestinian‐Israeli Conflict in Ten European Countries,” the following question was asked: “In your opinion, is it very important, somewhat important, somewhat unimportant or not important at all for our government to take a role in combating anti‐Semitism in our country?” The percentages for those who strongly agree or somewhat agree were
112 Phyllis Chesler, The New Anti‐Semitism: The Current Crisis and What We Must Do about It (
Kosmin and Paul Iganski, “Judeophobia – Not Your Parent’s Anti‐Semitism,” Ha’aretz, June 3, 2003; Amnon Rubinstein, “Fighting the New Anti‐Semitism,” Ha’aretz, December 2, 2003; Gabriel Schoenfeld, The Return of Anti‐Semitism (
113 Helen Nugent, “Chief Rabbi Flays Church over Vote on
114 That the Church of England was merely criticizing Israeli policy and not engaging in anti‐Semitism is clearly reflected in the February 10, 2006 letter that the Archbishop of Canterbury (Dr. Rowan Williams) sent to England’s Chief Rabbi (Jonathan Sacks) explaining the Church’s decision on divestment. For a copy of the letter, see “Archbishop: Synod Call Was Expression of Concern,” February 10, 2006, Downloaded from Church of England website, February 20, 2006.
115 Steven Kull (Principal Investigator), Americans on the Middle East Road Map (Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland, May 30, 2003), pp. 9‐11, 18‐19. Also see Steven Kull et al., Americans on the Israeli‐Palestinian Conflict (Program on International Policy Attitudes,
116 Robert G. Kaiser, “Bush and Sharon Nearly Identical on Mideast Policy,”
117 Lee Hockstader and Daniel Williams, “Israel Says It Won’t ‘Pay Price’ of Coalition,” Washington Post, September 18, 2001; Jonathan Karp, “Sharon Cancels Peace Talks in Rebuff to U.S. Concerns,” Wall Street Journal, September 24, 2001; Thomas Oliphant, “A Delicate Balance,” Boston Globe, September 18, 2001: “Israel’s Opportunity,” Los Angeles Times editorial, September 18, 2001.
118 Kurt Eichenwald, “U.S. Jews Split on
119 James Bennet, “
120 Jack Donnelly, “Nation Set to Push
121 Lee Hockstader, “Sharon Apologetic over Row with
122 Aluf Benn, “Analysis: Clutching at Straws,” Ha’aretz, September 18, 2001; “Excerpts from Talk by
123 Elaine Sciolino, “Senators Urge Bush Not to Hamper
124 Dana Milbank, “Bush Spokesman Gentle on Israeli Assault,”
125 Keith B. Richburg and Molly Moore, “
Otherwise He Should Get a New One,” Newsweek, April 29, 2002. Also see Mike Allen and John Lancaster, “Defiant Sharon Losing Support in White House,” Washington Post, April 11, 2002, which describes the Bush Administration’s anger with Sharon.
126 It is worth noting that the American people were generally supportive of Bush’s efforts to put pressure on
127 William Kristol and Robert Kagan, “‘Senior White House Aides:’ Speak Up!” Weekly Standard, April 11, 2002. For a graphic description of the heat that the Lobby put on Powell when he was in the Middle East, see Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), pp. 323‐326. Also see John Simpson, “Israeli Leader Has More Power in Washington than Powell,” Sunday Telegraph (London), April 14, 2002, which describes a joint press conference Powell and Sharon conducted by noting that: “the Secretary of State’s language, body and verbal, certainly were not that of the paymaster coming to call a client to account. Far from it. Mr. Powell seemed ingratiating, deferential; no doubt he realizes how much support Mr. Sharon has back in
128 James D. Besser, “No
Seek Unity on Mideast, for Now,”
129 Randall Mikkelsen, “White House Calls Sharon ‘Man of Peace’,” Reuters, April 11, 2002; Bill Sammon, “White House Softens Tone with Israel,” Washington Times, April 12, 2002.
130 Peter Slevin and Mike Allen, “Bush: Sharon A ‘Man of Peace’,”
131 Eilperin and Dewar, “Lawmakers Endorse
132 Arieh O’Sullivan, “Visiting Congressmen Advise
134 Quoted in Jefferson Morley, “Who’s in Charge?”
135 Bradley Burston, “Hamas ‘R’ Us,” Ha’aretz, January 18, 2006; Akiva Eldar, “Kadima to A New
Issue No. 260, February 3, 2006; Danny Rubenstein, “All We Did Was Switch the Non‐Partner,” Ha’aretz, February 5, 2006; “Disarray Among the Palestinians,” New York Times editorial, January 17, 2006.
136 Regarding the views of previous Presidents, see Clyde R. Mark, “Israeli‐United States Relations,” Issue Brief for Congress (
137 “US Scowcroft Criticizes Bush Admin’s Foreign Policy,” Financial Times, October 13, 2004. Also see Glenn Kessler, “Scowcroft is Critical of Bush,” Washington Post, October 16, 2004.
138 On Kerry, see Gadi Dechter, “Analysis: President Kerry on
139 Emad Mekay, “
140 Jason Keyser, “
141 Gideon Alon, “
142 Shlomo Brom, “An Intelligence Failure,” Strategic Assessment (
143 Marc Perelman, “Iraqi Move Puts
144 Ehud Barak, “Taking Apart
145 Benjamin Netanyahu, “The Case for Toppling Saddam,” Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2002. The Jerusalem Post was particularly hawkish on
Inbar, “Ousting Saddam, Instilling Stability,”
146 Aluf Benn, “Background: Enthusiastic IDF Awaits War in
147 Indeed, a February 2003 poll reported that 77.5 percent of Israeli Jews wanted the
148 Gideon Levy, “A Deafening Silence,” Ha’aretz, October 6, 2002.
149 See Dan Izenberg, “Foreign Ministry Warns Israeli War Talk Fuels US Anti‐Semitism,” Jerusalem Post, March 10, 2003, which makes clear that “the Foreign Ministry has received reports from the US” telling Israelis to cool their jets because “the US media” is portraying Israel as “trying to goad the administration into war.” There is also evidence that
150 The influence of the neoconservatives and their allies is clearly reflected in the following articles: See Joel Beinin, “Pro‐Israel Hawks and the Second Gulf War,” Middle East Report Online, April 6, 2003; Elisabeth Bumiller and Eric Schmitt, “On the Job and at Home, Influential Hawks’ 30‐Year Friendship Evolves,” New York Times, September 11, 2002; Kathleen and William Christison, “A Rose by Another Name: The Bush Administration’s Dual Loyalties,” CounterPunch, December 13, 2002; Robert Dreyfuss, “The Pentagon Muzzles the CIA,” The American Prospect, December 16, 2002; Michael Elliott and James Carney, “First Stop, Iraq,” Time, March 31, 2003; Seymour Hersh, “The Iraq Hawks,” New Yorker, Vol. 77, issue 41 (December 24‐31, 2001), pp. 58‐63; Glenn Kessler, “U.S. Decision on Iraq Has Puzzling Past,” Washington Post, January 12, 2003; Joshua M. Marshall, “Bomb Saddam?” Washington Monthly, June 2002; Dana Milbank, “White House Push for Iraqi Strike Is on Hold,”
Page, “Showdown with Saddam: The Decision to Act,” USA Today, September 11, 2002; Sam Tanenhaus, “Bush’s Brain Trust,” Vanity Fair, July 2003. Note that all these articles are from before the war started.
151 See Mortimer B. Zuckerman, “No Time for Equivocation,” U.S. News & World Report, August 26/September 2, 2002; Idem, “Clear and Compelling Proof,” U.S. News & World Report, February 10, 2003; Idem, “The High Price of Waiting,” U.S. News & World Report, March 10, 2003.
152 “An Unseemly Silence,” Forward, May 7, 2004. Also see Gary Rosenblatt, “Hussein Asylum,” Jewish Week, August 23, 2002; Idem, “The Case for War against Saddam,” Jewish Week, December 13, 2002.
153 Just before the
154 Samuel G. Freedman, “Don’t Blame Jews for This War,”
155 It is no exaggeration to say that in the wake of 9/11, the neoconservatives were not just determined, but were obsessed with removing Saddam from power. As one senior Administration figure put it in January, 2003, “I do believe certain people have grown theological about this. It’s almost a religion – that it will be the end of our society if we don’t take action now.” Kessler, “
156 The first letter (January 26, 1998) was written under the auspices of the Project for the New American Century and can be found on its website. The second letter (February 19, 1998) was written under the auspices of the Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf and can be found on the Iraq Watch website. Also see the May 29, 1998 letter to Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott written
under the auspices of the Project for the New American Century and found on its website. The neoconservatives, it should be emphasized, advocated invading
158 One might think from the publicity and the controversy surrounding two books published in 2004—Richard Clarke’s Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror (New York: Free Press, 2004) and Ron Suskind, The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O’Neill (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004)—that Bush and Cheney were bent on invading Iraq when they assumed office in late January 2001. However, this interpretation is wrong. They were deeply interested in toppling Saddam, just as Bill Clinton and Al Gore had been. But there is no evidence in the public record showing that Bush and Cheney were seriously contemplating war against
159 Woodward, Plan of Attack, pp. 25‐26. Wolfowitz was so insistent on conquering
160 Woodward, Plan of Attack, pp. 1‐44.
161 Regarding the neoconservatives’ influence on Cheney, see Elliott and Carney, “First Stop, Iraq”; Page, “Showdown with Saddam”; Michael Hirsh, “Bernard Lewis Revisited,” Washington Monthly, November 2004, pp.13‐19; Frederick Kempe, “Lewis’s ‘Liberation’ Doctrine for Mideast Faces New Tests,” Wall Street Journal, December 13, 2005; Carla Anne Robbins and Jeanne Cummings, “How Bush Decided that Hussein Must Be Ousted from Atop Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, June 14, 2002. On Cheney’s critical role in the decision‐making process, see Glenn Kessler and Peter Slevin, “Cheney is Fulcrum of Foreign Policy,” Washington Post, October 13, 2002; Barbara Slavin and Susan Page, “Cheney Rewrites Roles in Foreign Policy,” USA Today, July 29, 2002.
162 The New York Times reported shortly after 9/11 that, “Some senior administration officials, led by Paul D. Wolfowitz … and I. Lewis Libby … are pressing for the earliest and broadest military campaign against not only the Osama bin Laden network in Afghanistan, but also against other suspected terrorist bases in Iraq and in Lebanon’s Bekka region.” Patrick E. Tyler and Elaine Sciolino, “Bush Advisers Split on Scope of Retaliation,” New York Times, September 20, 2001. Also see William Safire, “Phony War II,” New York Times, November 28, 2002. Woodward succinctly describes Libby’s influence in Plan of Attack (pp. 48‐49): “Libby had three formal titles. He was chief of staff to Vice President Cheney; he was also national security adviser to the vice president; and he was finally an assistant to President Bush. It was a trifecta of positions probably never held before by a single person. Scooter was a power center unto himself …. Libby was one of only two people who were not principals to attend the National Security Council meetings with the president and the separate principals meetings chaired by Rice.” Also see ibid., pp 50‐51, 288‐292, 300‐301, 409‐410; Bumiller and Schmitt, “On the Job and at Home”; Karen Kwiatkowski, “The New Pentagon Papers,” Salon.com, March 10, 2004; Patrick E. Tyler and Elaine Sciolino, “Bush Advisers Split on Scope of Retaliation,” New York Times, September 20, 2001. On Libby’s relationship to
163 This letter was published in the Weekly Standard, October 1, 2001.
164 Robert Kagan and William Kristol, “The Right War,” Weekly Standard, October 1, 2001; Charles Krauthammer, “Our First Move: Take Out the Taliban,”
165 Even before the dust had settled at the
of Terror,” Jerusalem Post editorial, September 25, 2001; William Safire, “The Ultimate Enemy,” New York Times, September 24, 2001.
166 See James Bamford, A Pretext to War (
167 Woodward, Plan of Attack, p. 290.
168 See Bamford, Pretext to War, pp. 287‐291, 307‐331; David S. Cloud, “Prewar Intelligence Inquiry Zeroes In On Pentagon,” Wall Street Journal, March 11, 2004; Seymour M. Hersh, “Selective Intelligence,” New Yorker, Vol. 79, issue 11 (May 12, 2003), pp. 44‐50; Kwiatkowski, “New Pentagon Papers”; Jim Lobe, “Pentagon Office Home to Neo‐Con Network,” Inter Press Service News Agency, August 7, 2003; Greg Miller, “Spy Unit Skirted CIA on Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, March 10, 2004; Paul R. Pillar, “Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 2 (March‐April 2006), pp. 15‐27; James Risen, “How Pair’s Finding on Terror Led to Clash on Shaping Intelligence,” New York Times, April 28, 2004; Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “Threats and Responses: A C.I.A. Rival; Pentagon Sets Up Intelligence Unit.” New York Times October 24, 2002.
169 The Office of Special Plans relied heavily on information from Ahmed Chalabi and other Iraqi exiles and it had close links with various Israeli sources. Indeed, the Guardian reports that it “forged close ties to a parallel, ad hoc intelligence operation inside Ariel Sharon’s office in
170 See, for example, Douglas J. Feith, “The Inner Logic of Israel’s Negotiations: Withdrawal Process, Not Peace Process,” Middle East Quarterly, March 1996. For useful discussions of Feith’s views, see Jeffrey Goldberg, “A Little Learning: What Douglas Feith Knew and When He Knew It,” New Yorker, Vol. 81, issue 12 (May 9, 2005), pp. 36‐41; Jim Lobe, “Losing Feith, or is the Bush Team Shedding Its Sharper Edges?” The Daily Star, January 31, 2005; James J. Zogby, “A Dangerous Appointment: Profile of Douglas Feith, Undersecretary of Defense under Bush,”
Condoleezza] Rice said, ‘Thanks Doug, but when we want the Israeli position we’ll invite the ambassador’.”
171 The “Clean Break” study was prepared for The Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies in
172 Akiva Eldar, “Perles of Wisdom for the Feithful,” Ha’aretz, October 1, 2002.
173 “Rally Unites Anguished Factions under Flag of ‘Stand with
174 John McCaslin, “Israeli‐Trained Cops,” Washington Times, November 5, 2002; Bret Stephens, “Man of the Year,” Jerusalem Post (Rosh Hashana Supplement), September 26, 2003; Janine Zacharia, “Invasive Treatment,” in ibid. Other useful pieces on Wolfowitz include Michael Dobbs, “For Wolfowitz, A Vision May Be Realized,” Washington Post, April 7, 2003; James Fallows, “The Unilateralist,” Atlantic Monthly, March 2002, pp. 26‐29; Bill Keller, “The Sunshine Warrior,” New York Times Magazine, September 22, 2002; “Paul Wolfowitz, Velociraptor,” Economist, February 9‐15, 2002.
175 According to Feith’s former law partner, L. Marc Zell, Chalabi also promised to re‐build the pipeline that once ran from
176 Matthew E. Berger, “New Chances to Build Israel‐Iraq Ties,” Jewish Journal, April 28, 2003. Also see Bamford, Pretext to War, p. 293; Ed Blanche, “Securing Iraqi Oil for
177 Nir, “FBI Probe.” On the eve of the war, Bill Keller, who is now the executive editor of the New York Times, wrote: “The idea that this war is about
178 In an op‐ed written in mid‐2004, Hollings asked why the Bush Administration invaded
he says “everyone knows,” is “because we want to secure our friend
179 Michael Kinsley, “What Bush Isn’t Saying about
180 Robert S. Greenberger and Karby Leggett, “President’s Dream: Changing Not Just Regime but a Region: A Pro‐U.S., Democratic Area is a Goal that Has Israeli and Neo Conservative Roots,” Wall Street Journal, March 21, 2003. Also see George Packer, “Dreaming of Democracy,” New York Times Magazine, March 2, 2003. Although not all neoconservatives are Jewish, most of the founders were and virtually all were strong supporters of
181 See, for example, Rebuilding
182 Martin Indyk, “The Clinton Administration’s Approach to the
183 Barbara Conry, “America’s Misguided Policy of Dual Containment in the Persian Gulf,” Foreign Policy Briefing No. 33, CATO Institute, November 10, 1994; Gregory F. Gause III, “The Illogic of Dual Containment,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73. No. 2 (March/April 1994), pp. 56‐66; Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, Differentiated Containment:
184 Brzezinski and Scowcroft, Differentiated Containment, p. 6.
185 Brzezinski and Scowcroft, Differentiated Containment, p. 130.
186 For example, the Jerusalem Post noted in an editorial (September 9, 2002) that “according to Middle East expert Bernard Lewis, a post‐Saddam Iraq is one that would be more likely to make peace with Israel, defang Arab radicalism, and perhaps even catalyze revolutionary forces in present‐day Iran.” Similarly, Michael Ledeen wrote on August 6, 2002 in the National Review Online (“Scowcroft Strikes Out”) that, “If ever there was a region that richly deserved being cauldronized, it is the
187 Charles Krauthammer, “Peace through Democracy,”
188 Benn, “Background.” Also, the New York Times reported that Halevy gave a speech in
that “An Arab world without Saddam Hussein would enable many from this generation [leaders about to come into power] to embrace the gradual democratic opening that some of the Persian Gulf states and
189 See Seymour M. Hersh, “The Syrian Bet,” New Yorker, Vol. 79, issue 20 (July 28, 2003), pp. 32‐36; Molly Moore, “Sharon Asks U.S. to Pressure Syria on Militants,” Washington Post, April 17, 2003; Ori Nir, “Jerusalem Urges Bush: Next Target Hezbollah,” Forward, April 11, 2003; Idem, “Sharon Aide Makes the Case for U.S. Action against Syria, Forward, April 18, 2003; Marc Perelman, “Behind Warnings to Damascus: Reassessment of Younger Assad,” Forward, April 18, 2004; Daniel Sobelman and Nathan Guttman, “PM Urges U.S. to Keep Heat on Syria, Calls Assad ‘Dangerous’,” Ha’aretz, April 15, 2003.
191 Nir, “Sharon Aide.” Also see Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Toughens Warnings to
192 Nir, “Sharon Aide.” Also see Perelman, “Behind Warnings.” In their efforts to demonize
194 Nathan Guttman, “Some Senior
195 Quoted in Robin Wright, “
197 DeYoung, “
198 Ron Kampeas, “Bush, Once Reluctant on Sanctions, Prepares to Take a Tough Line with
199 Salhani, “The
200 Julian Borger, “Bush Vetoes
201 See Hersh, “The Syrian Bet.” Other pieces discussing the advantages for the United states of cooperating with Syria include Spencer Ackerman, “Rough Trade,” New Repulic, January 13, 2003; Susan Taylor Martin, “Experts Disagree on Dangers of Syria,” St. Petersburg Times, November 3, 2002; Salhani, “The Syria Accountability Act”; Stephen Zunes, “Bush Has Clear Run at Syria,” Asia Times Online, March 2, 2005.
202 Two articles that appeared in the Forward after
203 Quoted in Alan Sipress, “
42‐49; Peter Hirschberg, “Background/Peres Raises Iranian Threat,” Ha’aretz, February 5, 2002; David Hirst, “Israel Thrusts Iran in Line of US Fire,” Guardian, February 2, 2002; “Israel Once Again Sees Iran as A Cause for Concern,” Ha’aretz, May 7, 2001.
204 Stephen Farrell, Robert Thomson, and Danielle Haas, “Attack
205 “Ambassador to
206 In late May 2003, Inter Press Service reported that, “The neo‐cons’ efforts to now focus US attention on ‘regime change’ in Iran has become much more intense since early May and already has borne substantial fruit.” Jim Lobe, “
207 The flyer advertising the conference, which was entitled “The Future of Iran: Mullahcracy, Democracy and the War on Terror,” can be found at a number of sites on the web. Also see Green, “Neocons Dream of Lebanon”; Lobe, “U.S. Neo‐Cons Move Quickly.”
208 William Kristol, “The End of the Beginning,” Weekly Standard, February 12, 2003. Others writing articles at the time include Daniel Pipes and Patrick Clawson, who wrote a piece on May 20 for the Jerusalem Post entitled “Turn up the Pressure on
209 For evidence of the Lobby’s intensified efforts to get the Bush Administration to deal with the Iranian nuclear problem, see Stewart Ain, “Israel Urging U.S. to Stop Iran Nukes,” Jewish Week, October 7, 2005; Efraim Inbar, “The Imperatives to Use Force against Iranian Nuclearization,” BESA Center [Bar‐Ilan University, Israel] Perspectives, Number 12, December 1, 2005; Martin S. Indyk, “Iran’s Bluster Isn’t A Bluff,” Los Angeles Times, November 1, 2005; Ron Kampeas, “With Time Short on Iran Nukes, AIPAC Criticizes Bush Approach,” JTA, December 2, 2005; Charles Krauthammer, “In Iran, Arming for Armageddon,” Washington Post, December 16, 2005; Dafna Linzer, “Pro‐Israel Group Criticizes White House Policy on Iran,” Washington Post, December 25, 2005; Ori Nir, “New Sanction Bill Loses Momentum as Administration Presses Diplomacy,” Forward, June 10, 2005; Idem, “Jewish Groups Push for Iran Sanctions,” Forward, September 23, 2005; Idem, “Israeli Aides Warn U.S. Not to Drop Ball on
210 Some neoconservatives even welcome this outcome. For example, Robert Kagan and William Kristol wrote in the aftermath of 9/11 that, “
Commentary, September 2004; Brian Whitaker, “Playing Skittles with Saddam,” Guardian, September 3, 2002.
211 Ron Kampeas, “After Restructuring, AIPAC Plans to Focus on Wider