Palestine Cry: Palestine Cry: Christians United Against Religious Persecution « Kawther Salam
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 28, 2011
Palestine Cry: Christians United Against Religious Persecution « Kawther Salam
Beware the false peace of the Antichrist:
Libya was just castrated and made into a carcass for World Zionism and the New World Order.
Next is the Western Sahara and the Sahel. That is: Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Western Sahara. Below (south of) those are the buffer states (Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, Sudan and Eritrea) between traditional long time Arab cultured, Islamic civilization and traditional Bantu speaker culture African nations. These buffer nations will be targeted along with the rest of Africa and the NWO plan is to sweep all of Africa and its people into complete slavery. Especially watch the southern Sahel. The Pan-African movement had always looked to Gaddafi as a potential leader of all of Africa, in the role of spokesman. That of course has been destroyed. Gaddafi's mistakes included trusting the word of Washington and trusting Rome, Italy.
A note on Kardinal Schoenborn. He is Tubingen agente 'Benediktos' Ratzinger's prime shadow in covering over all of the Vatican's misdeeds. Schoenborn plays the good guy, but he is totally in Benediktos' pocket. They will be of no real help to anyone.
The Bavarian Guelph (and their central banks) have totally taken over the Vatican. They are core to the New World Order - the NWO is the Nazis and the Zionists and their puppet masters the Bavarian Guelph Illuminati. They hate all of Arab culture and Islam as standing in their way of the NWO ruling the world.
Apostasy: The Apostasy of the Vatican
The absolute core of Africa's suffering is this Judeo Satanism, which is also the foundation of the Occultic Illuminati centuries later: God and His Messiah Jesus Christ our Lord - our right and duty to witness to Him: Egyptian-African pre-Christian Gnostic Witchcraft, the beginning of Voodoo and variants of Occultism
It is Crucial to “De-Nairobify” the Somali Affairs
For a number of years, Nairobi (Kenya) has been the de facto capital of Somalia after the State has disintegrated into anarchy. It has been where Somalis sought refuge, re-started their lives, and networked with the rest of the world. By the same token, it has been where almost all of the eighteen or so failed “reconciliation” conferences were concocted, and Somalis found the funding and the nourishment for the indigenous political demons that kept them divided and at war with one another for over two decades.
Yet, to this day—at least from the international community’s point of view—all initiatives related to peace, security, humanitarian, and development must be conceived, crafted, and executed via Nairobi; Through a network of international institutions and organizations with sullied reputation of money squandering, laundering, and rewarding corruption with more contracts. And so long as this continues, so too would the status quo.
Like Vienna (Austria) during the Cold War, Nairobi became a magnet that attracts both the positive and the negative. It is a place where a few good apples are found- those Somali patriots who are committed to work to bring an end to the misery of their people. It is also a place where many rotten ones are found- those who callously sellout everything about their country and people. Nairobi is where the buyers meet the sellers. Moreover, the city is one of the major hubs for security experts, “dealmakers” and deal breakers. It is also the center where around a $1 billion that is donated annually on behalf of Somalia is managed and mismanaged. It is where corrupted technocrats and other colorful characters compete for geopolitical strategic advantages or for crude economic exploitation. The city is also the center for a new breed of diplomats known as “gorilla diplomats”.
In dealing with countries such as Somalia, these types of diplomats are granted the flexibility and authority to make decisions without any direct involvement of their Foreign Ministries. This, needless to say, has its positives and negatives. One of the positives might be their less bureaucratic decision-making capacity. One of the negatives might be the inadvertent creation of diplomatic despots who haphazardly assert authorities far exceeding their professional titles. Against this backdrop, the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Somalia, and the head of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia, Dr. Augustine Mahiga, had the liberty to nose dive into the intra-Somali politics of contention in his recent interview by Somalia Report.
As someone who occasionally freewheels beyond his diplomatic boundaries and subjectively tips the scale in favor of one convenient group to another, Dr. Mahiga pushed the limits with that interview. Without offering any substantiation to his claims, Dr. Mahiga offered this assertion when asked about the Somali politicians:
“There is a palace coup that has taken place in Villa Somalia. The Ala-Sheikh group is back in power, which should not be downplayed. The Ala-Sheikh group by definition never wanted any power sharing, they are against the Roadmap because of its inclusiveness to bring in the regions, to bring in Ahlu Sunnah, to bring in civil society.”
Why this crude accusation, especially when there is only 5 months left from the end of the transitional period?
Considering the timing of the message and the clout of the messenger, this was nothing but a desperate act to give traction to a baseless narrative that was being cooked since the Djibouti Agreement…that there is a clandestine Islamist cabal with sinister motives who are bent on high-jacking the political power. Consumed by that paranoia-based narrative and other erroneous assumptions that all organized Islamist groups, including those who are non-violent who are willing to legally partake in the political process, should not be trusted, Dr. Mahiga unleashes the following rant:
“They (Ala-Sheikh) are not very different than the Shabaab, except that they don’t take up arms. But for them, the fundamentals are the ideological purity, and they’ve reached a point where they have successfully staged a comeback, and they have just created a forum, which they have formed under Farmajo (former Prime Minister): an Islamic organization which they are going to transform into a political party”.
The boogieman, or the Al-Sheikh group that he referenced, are some of the students of the late Islamic scholar, Sheikh Mohamed Moallim during the 70s, 80s, and early 90s.
Contrary to the urban legend surrounding his influence, the Sheikh was in fact a progressive religious scholar who was ahead of his time. He graduated from Al-Azhar University, and his teachings were focused on bringing social and religious reform through non-violent means. He taught that the individual is part of the whole and that his/her actions either contribute positively or negatively to that whole- the society. And that the individual should never resort to bloodshed, or wreak havoc, or cause chaos even when living under an authoritarian government that publicly executed ten Islamic scholars and imprisoned a few others—including the Sheikh—for disagreeing with it.
As an active agent of positive change, the individual must rely on educating one self
(religious and secular) and on educating others, but to never impose his/her views on others.
A few individuals from that school of thought (and other Islamic thoughts) have joined the post Djibouti Agreement Transitional Federal Government. And though they were systematically cleansed out of the political structure through one “re-shuffle” or “accord”, their contribution and legacy stand out.
So, what threat does Dr. Mahiga fear? And even if it were true that that group and their allies in the Daljir Forum (a coalition of several political parties with diverse interests) have “successfully staged a comeback”, what is wrong with that? And more importantly, are we to deduce from Dr. Mahiga’s statements that there is a gatekeeper outside the will of the Somali people who should keep this wrongly implicated group in the periphery?
Considering the broad-based negative reaction his statements have generated and official grievances filed through the UN Secretary General’s office, Dr. Mahiga’s statements are not considered the result of judgment deficit. Rather, they are considered as statements that were deliberately crafted to sow the seeds of suspicion and conflict between certain political parties and groups. And since the groups under this attack were the very same groups that openly advocated for the transfer of all international community offices that deal with the Somalia issue to either Mogadishu or other parts of Somalia, this raises yet another question: Was this a payback for pressuring the UN and other international organization to leave their cozy environment in Nairobi and transfer their operations to Mogadishu- something that Dr. Mahiga had to do a few months earlier?
Be that as it may, the process of “de-Nairobification” must continue. In addition to bringing an end to the costly routine of multiple outsourcing of all projects and services to Somalia, such decision will bring an end to a detrimental sub-culture that developed since the break up of the State. A sub-culture that lures governmental officials and members of the Parliament to accept invitations and attend private meetings with various colorful foreign characters of multiple agendas at the privacy of their offices, hotel rooms, and residence.
Though this sub-culture has been under scrutiny for the past 18 months, enforcement has been all but effective. Mainly because these non-transparent and questionable freewheeling often takes place away from the government’s radar.
Iran Talks: What Should Be on the Table?
March 23, 2012
Upcoming talks between Iran and the "P5+1" powers--the United States, the UK, Russia, China, France, and Germany--reportedlyscheduled for April 13 in Geneva present a crucial opening to restart negotiations on Iran's disputed nuclear program (Haaretz). Four nuclear security experts lay out what the priorities should be for the talks:
All agree on the need to address immediate proliferation risks, including halting Iran's accumulation of 20 percent enriched uranium. David Albright of the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security says the negotiations should focus on laying the groundwork for a long-term accord and reject any Iranian effort to trade short-term concessions for a reduction in sanctions. Mark Fitzpatrick of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies recommends the international community propose technical measures that make it difficult for Tehran to enrich uranium above 20 percent levels in the future. Daryl G. Kimball of the Arms Control Association argues that a permanent enrichment halt is unrealistic, and says the talks should instead aim to link enrichment capacity to the actual needs of Iran's nuclear power reactors. Jonathan Pearl, a former CFR fellow, says the P5+1 should revisit and update earlier fuel swap proposals in exchange for Iranian concessions.
David Albright, President, Institute for Science and International Security
The goal of upcoming negotiations should be a framework agreement that incorporates a series of stages where each step includes concessions from Iran matched with incentives or concessions from the P5+1. Negotiations should also focus on laying the groundwork for a long-term accord that will likely take several years.
Certain measures deserve priority in the initial negotiations. The first is an Iranian commitment to cap all enrichment at 5 percent and freeze the installation of additional centrifuges at the Qom enrichment plant. Iran could also address at least some IAEA concerns about the military dimensions of its past nuclear efforts.
The United States and its allies should be prepared to provide Iran with commensurate incentives, including the provision of 19.75 percent enriched uranium fuel for its Tehran Research Reactor (TRR); the supply of 19.75 percent low enriched uranium (LEU) targets for medical isotope production in this reactor; a supply of medical isotopes of the type that the TRR would produce; and a commitment by the P5 +1 not to seek new UN Security Council sanctions for a defined period of time. At the same time, the United States and its allies should reject any Iranian effort to trade interim measures for a reduction in sanctions.
Negotiations should also focus on laying the groundwork for a long-term accord that will likely take several years.
In previous negotiations, Iran has sought to establish an essentially unbridled right to uranium enrichment. But the P5+1 is unlikely to acknowledge this without a verified assurance that it is in compliance with the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, something lacking today.
ISIS has proposed a five-stage framework agreement with Iran:
Updated, verified "freeze for freeze" agreement
• Iran coming clean in a verifiable manner about its nuclear weaponization activities, and receiving significant sanctions relief and security guarantees
• Intensive IAEA verification, temporary suspension of sensitive Iranian nuclear programs, and provisional suspension of UN Security Council sanctions
• IAEA certification of absence of undeclared nuclear materials and facilities, end of suspension of Iran's nuclear programs, provision of major incentives package, and end of U.S. sanctions
• Growth of Iran's civil nuclear program and end of all remaining sanctions
Mark Fitzpatrick, Senior Fellow for Nonproliferation, International Institute for Strategic Studies
The immediate aim of the upcoming talks is to build confidence that Iran will not be able to make a quick sprint to build nuclear weapons. This will require limits on its nuclear program and greater transparency. The limits mandated by successive UN Security Council resolutions remain the ideal: suspension of the nuclear activities that cause concern. There is no chance, however, that Iran will cave in completely after six years of resisting this demand.
Iran might agree to suspend 20 percent enrichment, as President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad offered last autumn, in exchange for the provision of fuel enriched to that level for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). But now that Iran can produce TRR fuel plates on its own, albeit with safety certification problems, his offer may be overtaken by events. Persuading Iran to depart with its stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium would be even more difficult, although two years ago, at least Iran accepted the principle that a portion of its enriched product could be exported.
Unlike the IAEA, the P5+1 can offer immunity from further penalties if Iran agrees to grant access that might confirm past work on weaponization.
Iran would be more willing to forego steps it has not yet taken, such as enrichment above 20 percent--a move it might someday try to justify on grounds that medical isotopes can be produced more efficiently if targets for the TRR are made of highly enriched uranium (HEU). The P5+1 could offer HEU targets in order to preempt any such excuse. To enhance confidence that enrichment is kept below 20 percent (or, better, 5 percent), technical measures should be proposed that would make it more difficult to adjust centrifuge cascades to enrich at higher levels. The IAEA should also be allowed to detect enrichment levels at Fordow and Natanz on a real-time basis, without only having to rely on sending environmental samples back to Austria for time-consuming analysis.
For increased transparency, Iran should be pressed to follow standard IAEA rules by reporting new facilities before they are built (the Code 3.1 requirement), and to again provisionally implement the Additional Protocol. Iran should also be persuaded to grant IAEA access to facilities, individuals, and documents associated with the alleged nuclear activities with "possible military dimensions," as the IAEA puts it. Unlike the IAEA, the P5+1 can offer immunity from further penalties if Iran agrees to grant access that might confirm past work on weaponization.
Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association
Iran continues to improve its uranium enrichment capabilities and already has some of the expertise needed to build nuclear weapons. But it is clear that a nuclear-armed Iran is neither imminent nor inevitable.
One high-profile meeting will not, however, produce a long-term deal. Progress requires a sustained, serious dialogue consisting of high-level and technical meetings on a multilateral and bilateral basis.
To begin, the negotiators need to seek agreement on confidence-building steps that address the highest priority proliferation risks. Iran's growing stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium would allow Iran to shorten its time frame to produce weapons, if it chose to do so. The P5+1 should test Iran's offer to stop enriching to 20 percent if it receives fuel for its Tehran Research Reactor, and secure agreement on the removal of its existing 20 percent enriched uranium stockpile.
Another key objective should be to secure more intrusive IAEA access to all of Iran's nuclear-related sites under the terms of the IAEA Additional Protocol and convince Tehran to finally address the agency's questions about suspected weapons-related work at key sites, including Parchin. This would reduce the risk of clandestine nuclear work and reduce the risk to Iran of even tighter international sanctions.
The long term P5+1 goal should be to limit enrichment levels to normal reactor fuel grade, link enrichment capacity to the actual needs of Iran's nuclear power reactors, and establish a more robust system of inspections.
A permanent uranium enrichment halt, as called for by some, would be ideal, but is not realistic given Iran's existing enrichment capacity and the strong support for enrichment across the Iranian political spectrum.
Rather, the long-term P5+1 goal should be to limit enrichment levels to normal reactor fuel grade, link enrichment capacity to the actual needs of Iran's nuclear power reactors, and establish a more robust system of inspections.
Responsible leaders in Washington, London, Paris and elsewhere understand that sanctions have bought time and improved negotiating leverage, but will not, in isolation, persuade Tehran's leaders to halt their sensitive nuclear activities. They also see that the "military option" would be ineffective and counterproductive. Air strikes on Iran's facilities would set back Iran's program for no more than a couple of years, convince its leaders to pursue nuclear weapons openly, and lead to adverse economic and security consequences.
There is no guarantee that diplomacy and pressure will be effective in convincing Iran's current and future leaders they stand to gain more from forgoing nuclear weapons than from any decision to build them. But it's the best option on the table.
Jonathan Pearl, Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, 2010-2011
The Obama administration has publicly committed to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Some ambiguities remain about Washington's red lines, but the failure of a new round of P5+1 negotiations could bring the United States closer to war, whether on its own accord or as aconsequence of Israeli strikes that draw America to the defense of its ally.
Given the stakes, a wide variety of options must be on the table during the upcoming round of talks with Iran, provided the outcome is an effective end to the threat of Iranian weaponization.
As an opening gambit, the United States and its partners should revisit and update earlier fuel swap proposals in exchange for Iranian concessions of immediate importance, including suspending work at the deeply buried Fordow facility as well as halting production of 20 percent enriched uranium. Despite the failure of previous efforts, continually tighteningsanctions on Iran's petroleum and banking sectors and the lingering threat of military strikes might yet force Tehran's hand.
The failure of a new round of P5+1 negotiations could bring the United States closer to war, whether on its own accord or as a consequence of Israeli strikes that draw America to the defense of its ally.
The goal would be to determine whether Tehran is finallywillingand able to compromise, or simply looking to buy time in anticipation of the upcoming IAEA Board of Governors decision on whether to send its file back to the UN Security Council.
If Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei proves amenable to compromise, the P5+1 and Iran could pursue a series of confidence-building measures over the coming months, with strict but realistic deadlines for compliance, and penalties for noncompliance.
The more difficult question is what should be on the table if the P5+1 talks progress to the next stage. Some Iran experts believe that a comprehensive deal will only be possible if it permits Iran to retain, for example, a small-scale uranium enrichment capacity. These terms might seem unpalatable but, interestingly, the Obama administration has not yet ruled out such an option.
Far-reaching discussions are, however, a long way off. Iran could take a first step in that direction by settling its accounts with the IAEA and the UN Security Council, providing IAEA inspectors full access to all sites of interest, and ending its support for terrorist organizations.
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